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THE HEALTH CARE CHOICE ACT: THE
INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET AND
THE POLITICS OF "CHOICE"
ELIZABETH

A.

PENDO*

INTRODUCTION

Our health care system is in crisis. Although we spent nearly
$1.9 trillion on health care in 2004,1 a figure expected to rise to $3.1
trillion by 2012,2 this appears to be the result of higher prices,
rather than increased access to or usage of health care. 3 At the
same time, health insurance is increasingly hard to get, keep, and
afford. As a result, a growing number of Americans are unin
sured-46 million people in 2004, an increase of 6 million since
2000. 4
Traditionally, employer-sponsored group insurance plans have
been the backbone of health insurance coverage in the United
States. While it is still true that most Americans get their health
* Copyright © 2006-07. Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law;
B.A. 1990, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1993, Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California, Berkeley. Thank you to Nicolas Johnson and Robert Kerr for
excellent research assistance, and to Kathy Cerminara for her thoughtful comments.
1. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE
CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/
7031 (follow the "Section 1" hyperlink) [hereinafter TRENDS AND INDICATORS] (last
visited Mar. 22, 2007) ("Expenditures in the United States on health care were nearly
$1.9 trillion in 2004, more than two and a half times the $717 billion spent in 1990, and
more than seven times the $255 billion spent in 1980.").
2. Stephen Heffler et aI., Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012, HEALTH
AFF., Feb. 7, 2003, at W3-54, W3-54, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprintlhlthaff.w3.54v1.pdf.
3. Gerard Anderson et aI., It's the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States is So Dif
ferent from Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2003, at 89, 90, available at http://
content.healthaffairs.org/cgilreprint/22/3/89. According to testimony before the Senate,
"we pay higher prices for the same services, have higher administrative costs, and per
form more complex specialized procedures" than other countries. KAREN DAVIS &
BARBARA S. COOPER, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: WHY
So COSTLY? 3 (2003), available at http://www.cmwf.org/uscdoc/davis_senatecommittee
testimony_654.pdf.
4. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, GAPS IN HEALTH IN
SURANCE: AN ALL-AMERICAN PROBLEM 1 (2006), available at http://www.cmwf.org/
usr_doc/collins....gapshltins_920.pdf.
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insurance through employment,S the erosion of employer-spon
sored coverage has increased the ranks of the uninsured. 6 It has
also pushed more workers, retirees, and their families into the indi
vidual insurance market-a small but important part of the broader
health insurance market.
Despite its relatively small size-9.1 percent of the population,
or nearly 27 million people, turned to individual policies for health
insurance coverage in 2005 7 -the individual market is increasingly
important. 8 States have been active in regulating the individual
market, and there now appears to be increased federal interest in
connection with proposed tax credits for the purchase of individual

5. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 16 (2005), avail·
able at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf ("The percentage of people
covered by employment-based health insurance decreased to 59.8 percent in 2004, from
60.4 percent in 2003."); see also KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA:
2004 DATA UPDATE 10 fig.2 (2005), available at http://www.kff.orgluninsured/upload/
health-coverage-in-america-2004·data-update-report.pdf [hereinafter 2004 DATA UP.
DATE] (61 percent of nonelderly covered by employer-sponsored health insurance);
GARY CLAXTON ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH REs. &
EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 39-49
(2005), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/upload/7315.pdf (60 percent of
nonelderly covered by employer-sponsored health insurance in 2005).
6. For an overview of the uninsured and access to care, see Elizabeth A. Pendo,
Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film: The Dissolving Critique, 37 J. HEALTH L.
267, 284-87 (2004) [hereinafter Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film].
7. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Health Insurance Tables, Table HI-I: Health
Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin,
1987 to 2005, http://www.census.gov/hhes/wwwlhlthinslhistoriclhihistt1.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2007); see also DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 5, at 19 fig.6 (stating that in
2004, 9.3 percent of the population had individual coverage; in 2003, 9.2 percent); 2004
DATA UPDATE, supra note 5, at tbl.1 (stating that in 2004, 5.4 percent of the population
under age 65, or nearly 14 million people, had individual coverage); BETH C. FUCHS,
THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HEALTH POLICY ALTERNATIVES, INC., Ex·
PANDING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: LESSONS FROM THE STATE
REFORMS OF THE 1990s, at 3, 18 n.4 (2004), available at http://www.rwjf.org/
pubJications/synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/n04_synthesisreport.pdf (stating that in
2002, only about 7 percent of Americans under the age of 65, or approximately 17
million people, had individual health insurance coverage).
8. Jon Gabel et aI., Individual Insurance: How Much Financial Protection Does it
Provide?, HEALTH AFF., Apr. 17, 2002, at WI72 [hereinafter Gabel et aI., Individual
Insurance], available at http://content.healthaffairs.orglcgilreprint/hlthaff.w2.172vl.pdf
(quoting Deborah L. Rogal & Anne K. Gauthier, The Evolution of the Individual Insur
ance Market, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 3 (2000)) ("The long-term decline of em
ployer-based insurance has thrust individual insurance, long viewed by the insurance
industry as the 'residual market' onto center stage.").
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health insurance. 9 Unfortunately, this market has not worked well
for consumers, because individual policies usually cost more and
cover less than those obtained through an employer, and even those
consumers who can afford it may not have access.
The Health Care Choice Act of 2005 (HCCA)lO aims to reform
perceived problems in the individual market, and is touted as part
of the solution to the problem of the uninsured. It purports to al
low individuals who are not eligible for or cannot afford group cov
erage to purchase an individual policy in and from any state. If
passed, the HCCA would allow health insurers to offer individual
policies of insurance from any state without being required to com
ply with the laws of the insured's own state. Its proponents claim
that it would lower the cost of individual health insurance by bypas
sing state laws such as those mandating benefits, and offer consum
ers more choice.
The HCCA has not received a lot of attention, perhaps be
cause it was overshadowed by another bill, the Health Insurance
Marketplace Modernization and Affordability Act (Enzi Bill),
aimed at the small-group market. 11 But the HCCA is worth exam
ining because it represents a bad choice for the individual market.
It does not appear that the HCCA would lower costs for most pur
chasers, increase meaningful choices, or reduce the overall number
of uninsured. Moreover, the HCCA would permit health insurers
to sell policies from the states with the fewest consumer protec
tions, and to market and sell those policies to consumers in all other
9. See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 7 (examining state reforms of the insurance mar
ket); Press Release, The White House, Making Health Care More Affordable and Ac
cessible for All Americans (May 1, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/05/20060501-S.html [hereinafter "Making Health Care More Affordable
and Accessible for All Americans"] (outlining President George W. Bush's health care
agenda, including a refundable tax credit to help low-income Americans purchase
health coverage on the individual market). The Journal of Health Politics, Policy and
Law also devoted an entire issue to policy initiatives in the individual market. 25 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 3 (2000).
10. The Health Care Choice Act of 2005, H.R. 2355, 109th Congo (2005); S. 1015,
109th Congo (2005).
11. Health Insurance Marketplace Modernization and Affordability Act (Enzi
Bill), S. 1955, 109th Congo (2005). The Enzi Bill, named in recognition of its sponsor,
Senator Michael Enzi, would have permitted small businesses and trade association to
join together to form association health plans across state lines, and to offer coverage in
a state without complying with its mandated benefit laws. 152 CONGo REC. S4459 (daily
ed. May 11, 2006) (statement of Sen. Enzi). The bill was effectively blocked in the
Senate on May 11, 2006, by a failure of a motion to close debate. U.S. Senate, U.S.
Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress-2nd Session (reporting that the cloture motion
was rejected on S. 1955); 152 CONGo REc. S4459-60 (daily ed. May 11,2006).
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states. This would erode important consumer protections under
state law and undercut the role of the states in regulating health
insurance products and protecting their citizens.
Worse, the HCCA could increase the existing problem of frag
mentation in the individual and broader insurance markets and di
vert attention away from systemic issues such as the increasingly
high cost of health care, and the growing crisis of un- and under
insurance. Indeed, the HCCA can be seen as an example of the
larger political approach to health care policy, one focused on indi
vidual, market-based solutions that undermine the concept of
health insurance as an expression of social solidarity and collective
responsibility.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET

Although the individual market covers a relatively small per
centage of the popUlation, it provides a critical source of coverage
for people without access to group coverage. As noted by one
author,
Anyone can find himself or herself in need of individual insur
ance. Common circumstances that lead people to seek coverage
in the individual market include "aging off" a parent's coverage,
getting a job without health benefits, self-employment, working
part time or taking extended leave, becoming divorced or wid
owed, and retiring before the age of 65, when Medicare coverage
begins. Thus, people who are used to having employment-based
or public coverage may still need individual health insurance at
some point during their lifetime. 12

The role of the individual market as a "safety net" for those
without access to a group policy on a short- or long-term basis may
become even more important as employer-based health coverage
continues to erode, and the number of uninsured continues to
12. KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., How Ac
CESSIBLE IS INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CONSUMERS IN LESS-THAN-PERFECT
HEALTH? 1 (2001), available at http://www.kff.orglinsurance/20010620a-index.cfm (fol
low the "Report" hyperlink). Workers who have exhausted their eligibility for continu
ation health insurance coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986), may also
find themselves in the individual market. See generally LISA DUCHON ET AL., COM
MONWEALTH FUND, SECURITY MATrERS: How INSTABILITY IN HEALTH INSURANCE
PUTS U.S. WORKERS AT RISK 24-25 (2001), available at http://www.cmwf.orglusr_doc/
duchon_securitymatters_512.pdf.
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rise. 13 Unfortunately, the individual insurance market has not
worked well for consumers.
A.

Cost

Individual policies usually cost more and cover less than those
obtained through an employer.14 Unlike employer-based coverage,
in many states the health and claims history of applicants for indi
vidual policies may be examined prior to an offer of coverage, and
premiums may vary according to the applicant's health status, age,
and sex.IS Moreover, in an unregulated market, there are generally
no limits on the premiums the insurer can charge. 16 Although relia
ble data is difficult to find,n according to a 2004 survey of policies
actually purchased, the average annual premium for an individual
policy was $2,268 for an individual, and $4,424 for a family.ls Other
studies have looked at a smaller number of purchases, or at premi
ums offered but not adjusted for medical underwriting. For exam
ple, a 2001 study by eHealthInsurance reported annual premiums
13. Gabel et aI., Individual Insurance, supra note 8, at Wl72 ("The long-term
decline of employer-based insurance has thrust individual insurance, long viewed by the
insurance industry as the 'residual market' onto center stage.").
14. See, e.g., id. at W176, W177, W178 exhibit 3 (comparing the costs and availa
ble benefits of individual and group health insurance plans).
15. See id. at W173 (describing the process of medical underwriting); POLLITZ ET
AL., supra note 12, at 1 (describing a study that constructed seven hypothetical appli
cants and asked nineteen insurance companies and managed care organizations in eight
markets how they would respond to an application for coverage); NANCY C. TURNBULL
& NANCY M. KANE, HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, INSURING THE HEALTHY OR
INSURING THE SICK? THE DILEMMA OF REGULATING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSUR.
ANCE MARKET 17 fig.3 (2005), available at http://www.cmwf.orglusr_docI771_turnbull_
insurinR-healthy_or_sick_findings.pdf (comparison of predicted premiums by family
characteristics ).
16. Federal law does not regulate premium rates in the individual market. See
DENISE HARRIS & KATHLEEN STOLL, FAMILIES USA, Protecting Consumers from Un
fair Rate Hikes: The Need for Regulation of Health Insurance Renewal Premium In
creases 7 n.1 (2003), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/
Rate_Hikes_Revised_Feb_2003ca7a.pdf.
17. See FUCHS, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that reliable premium comparisons are
difficult because advertised premiums do not reflect increases due to medical under
writing; premiums vary according to factors such as age, sex, health status, and state;
policies are not standardized; and premiums may be higher upon renewal).
18. THOMAS F. WILDSMITH, CTR. FOR POL'y & RESEARCH, AM. HEALTH INS.
PLANS, INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF AF.
FORDABILITY, ACCESS, AND BENEFITS 5 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.ahip
research.orglpdfs/individuaUnsurance_survey_report8-26-2005. pdf (discussing a survey
based on actual purchases of "just under 1.9 million policies, covering approximately 3.2
million [people]"). The survey is "the most extensive industry survey of individual cov
erage undertaken to date." Id. at 1.
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averaging $1,200 to $1,500 for individual policies,19 and a 2002 study
by the Health Insurance Association of America reported average
single premiums of $2,070 and family premiums of $4,009. 20 These
figures reflect the first premium offered or accepted, not the actual
or entire cost of individual coverage. For example, once the policy
has been issued, rates can generally be increased upon renewal. 21
In addition, cost sharing features such as deductibles and co-insur
ance are often higher with individual plans,22 and premiums paid
for individual coverage do not receive the same preferential tax
treatment as employer-sponsored plans. 23
Although premiums for individual coverage can vary widely, it
is clear that cost is a major barrier to the individual market. The
majority of uninsured adults reported cost as the reason they lacked
coverage. 24 The majority of people who have considered purchas
ing an individual health plan in recent years have found it un afford
able, and only a minority of those who looked into an individual
policy ended up purchasing coverage. 25
19. VIP PATEL, EHEALTHINSURANCE, ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SALES DATA OF
INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY HEALTH INSURANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HEALTH INSURANCE TAX CREDITS 2 (2001), available at
h up:1Iwww.ehealthinsurance.com/ehealthinsurance/eHealth2.pdf ( discussing survey
based on 20,000 actual sales by eHealthlnsurance).
20. THOMAS D. Musco, HEALTH INS. ASs'N OF AM., HIAA SURVEY: INDIVID
UAL MEDICAL EXPENSE INSURANCE: AFFORDABLE, SERVES YOUNG AND OLD 1 tbl.1
(2002), available at http://www.ahipresearch.orgjPDFs/19_HIAAlndividuaIMarket
Premiums.pdf.
21. In general, federal law does not regulate premium rates in the individual mar
ket. See HARRIS & STOLL, supra note 16, at 3. Although the Health Insurance Porta
bility and Accessibility Act (HIPAA) provides that an individual leaving group
coverage can purchase an individual policy that is guaranteed to be renewable, 42
U.S.c. §§ 300gg-41 to -42 (2006), it does not limit the premium that the offering insurer
may charge, 42 U.S.c. § 300gg-41(f)(1). In 2002, a federal bill was introduced that
would limit the practice of medical re-underwriting as a basis for increasing premiums
for an individual insured at the time of renewal, but to date, it has not passed. Health
Insurance Fairness Act, S. 3119, 107th Congo (2002); H.R. 5682, 107th Congo (2002).
22. See, e.g., Gabel et aI., Individual Insurance, supra note 8, at 176-77.
23. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST Es
TIMATE, H.R. 2355 HEALTH CARE CHOICE ACT OF 2005, at 5 (2005) [hereinafter CBO
COST ESTIMATE] (as ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and Com
merce on July 20, 2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6639/hr2355.
pdf. For an overview of the tax treatment of health care plans, see Amy B. Monahan,
The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 TuL. L. REV. 777,
782-86 (2006).
24. JOHN A. GRAVES & SHARON K. LONG, THE URBAN INST., WHY Do PEOPLE
LACK HEALTH INSURANCE? 4 fig.1 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/Uploaded
PDF/411317 _lack_health_ins. pdf (54 percent of uninsured adults under age 65 reported
high cost as the reason they were uninsured).
25. DUCHON ET AL., supra note 12, at 24-25.
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Access

Even those who can afford individual coverage may not have
access. In most states, health insurers offering individual policies
have no legal obligation to offer or provide coverage. 26 In an un
regulated market, insurers can exclude from or impose waiting peri
ods for coverage of applicants with pre-existing conditions. 27 For
example, a study by the Kaiser Family Foundation looking at seven
applicants of varying age, gender, and life circumstances and with
seven different pre-existing conditions-including,hay fever, a sur
gically repaired knee, asthma and recurrent ear infections, breast
cancer, depression, high blood pressure, and HIV+ status-found
that overall the applicants were rejected 37 percent of the time. 28
When offers of coverage were made, only 10 percent of the offers
were at the standard rate, and most contained benefit restrictions,
surcharges, or both. 29 In an unregulated market, individuals in less
than-perfect health may be offered coverage at prohibitively high
rates or denied coverage altogether. 30
C.

Adequacy

The quality or adequacy of coverage available on the individ
ual market is also an issue. Individual policies usually cover less
than those obtained through an employer. For instance, individual
policies typically offer lower levels of reimbursement. One study
reported that individual insurance covers, on average, 63 percent of
medical bills, while group insurance covers 75 percent. 31 Consum
ers also may have a difficult time finding coverage for what many
consider to be basic benefits, such as "maternity benefits, mental
26. HIPAA provides the right to buy an individual policy for individuals leaving
group coverage, and in the small group market, but federal law does not ensure access
for those previously uninsured or covered by a different individual policy. See 42
U.S.c. § 300gg-42. Only a few states have enacted guaranteed issue laws that ensure
the right of people to purchase in the individual market. See FUCHS, supra note 7, at 7
fig.6 (stating that, as of 2000, twelve states had enacted guaranteed issue laws).
27. See FUCHS, supra note 7, at 7 fig.6 (stating that, as of 2000, thirty-one states
had enacted laws limiting exclusions for pre-existing conditions).
28. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 12, at ii, 17 chart 6, 20.
29. Id. at 20. The average annual premium offered was $3,996, a significant in
crease from the standard average annual rate of $2,988. Id. at 2l.
30.

See

ALLIANCE

FOR

HEALTH

REFORM,

HEALTH

CARE

COVERAGE

IN

10 (2006), availa
ble at http://www.allhealth.org/publications/pub_7.pdf. HIPAA prohibits insurers from
excluding or medically underwriting individuals in group health plans, but offers no
such protection for individuals seeking individual policies. See id.
31. Gabel et aI., Individual Insurance, supra note 8, at WI72.
AMERICA: UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
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health care, and prescription medications [which] tends to be lim
ited, especially in comparison to what is typically offered under
group health plans."32 As stated above, in the absence of state reg
ulation, insurers can also exclude coverage of pre-existing condi
tions and impose significant waiting periods.
It is well known that less comprehensive health plans can sub
ject people to tremendous health and financial risks.33 According
to one study, "[over half] the underinsured (54 %) and uninsured
(59%) went without at least one of four needed medical services
double the rate of those with adequate insurance."34 Moreover,
"rates of medical bill stress among the underinsured were equal to
those reported by the uninsured. "35 It is not surprising, then, that
people with individual policies are less likely to say that they feel
"well protected" by their insurance than people with group policies,
and the majority of them are at least somewhat worried that their
health plan will not pay for their health care needs. 36
D.

State Regulation

In response to problems such as these, states have used their
traditional regulatory powers under the McCarran-Ferguson Act37
32. POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 12, at 31; see SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMON
WEALTH FUND, PAYING MORE FOR LESS: OLDER ADULTS IN THE INDIVIDUAL INSUR
ANCE MARKET 1-2 (2005) (citations omitted), available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/
841_Collins_oldecadults_ib.pdf ("[A]dults ages 50 to 70 who rely on individual market
insurance pay much higher premiums than their counterparts with employer coverage
or Medicare.... Yet, ... older adults with individual coverage ... have far less compre
hensive coverage and are more likely to face insurance restrictions and administrative
complications," poorer access to care, and higher out-of-pocket expenses.).
33. See generally SHERRY GLIED ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, BARE
BONES HEALTH PLANS: ARE THEY WORTH THE MONEY? (2002), available at http://
www.cmwf.orglusr_doc/glied_barebones_518.pdf; Laura Tollen & Robert M. Crane, A

Temporary Fix? Implications of the Move Away from Comprehensive Health Benefits,
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Apr. 2002, at 1, available at http://www.ebrLorglpdflbriefspdf/
0402ib.pdf.
34. Cathy Schoen et aI., Commonwealth Fund, Insured but Not Protected: How
Many Adults are Underinsured?, HEALTH AFF., June 14,2005, at W5-289.
35. Id.; see also FUCHS, supra note 7, at 4; ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM,
supra note 30, at 5.
36. Assessment of Current Plan, HEALTH POLL REPORT (The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Found.), Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 4, available at http://www.kff.orglhealthpollreportl
Oct_2004/upload/healthpoll_oct04.pdf ("People who purchase their own insurance are
less likely to say they feel well protected by their insurance (43 %) than people who are
insured through their employers (58%). Nearly six in ten (57%) self-purchasers are at
least somewhat worried that their health plan will not pay for their health care needs
(including 11 % who say their insurance is inadequate and they feel very worried).").
37. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).
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to enact various reforms to the individual market. In general, these
reforms attempt to make coverage more accessible and affordable,
and to spread risk across a large number of people. 38 Common
types of state regulation include: guaranteed issue laws; guaranteed
renewal laws; limitations of exclusions for pre-existing conditions;
rating reforms aimed at limiting the extent to which premiums can
vary by age, sex, or health status, such as rating bands or commu
nity rating; and reforms designed to spread risk across insurers.39
Another key area of state regulation is aimed at the adequacy
of coverage, addressed through mandated benefit laws that require
insurers to offer or cover a specific provider, procedure, or bene
fit. 40 For example, Massachusetts law requires that all health insur
ance policies that provide coverage for pregnancy-related benefits
must provide the same extent of "coverage for medically necessary
expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility."41 About one
third of the states have enacted some type of mandated benefit law
requiring insurers to offer or to cover certain infertility treat
ments.42 According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, "Over the
38. FUCHS, supra note 7, at 7-9.
39. See generally id. (defining and summarizing types of reforms); TURNBULL &
KANE, supra note 15, at 2-3 (same). For case studies of regulations in individual states,
see Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New York's Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y
& L. 71 (2000); Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of Vermont's Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'y & L. 101 (2000); Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual
Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky and Massachusetts, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y
& L. 133 (2000); Katherine Swartz & Deborah W. Garnick, Lessons from New Jersey,
25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 45 (2000).
40. There are a few federal mandates. For example, ERISA has been amended
to require that health care benefit plans include coverage for post-delivery hospital
stays, 29 U.S.c. § 1185(a) (2000), and to require coverage for certain post-mastectomy
treatment and care, including reconstruction, 29 U.S.c. § 1185b(a).
41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (2004). The Massachusetts Health Care Re
form plan currently includes all presently mandated benefits, although there is a mora
torium on new mandated benefits until January 1, 2008, when the State will complete a
study of the cost and necessity of existing mandates. 2006 Mass. Legis. Servo 121
(West).
42. A summary of state infertility insurance coverage laws can be found at the
webpage of the National Conference of State Legislatures. Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, 50 State Summary of State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infer
tility Therapy, http://www.ncsl.orgiprogramslhealth/50infert.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2007). Of course, employers may choose to include infertility treatment in their health
plans absent a state mandate. See Mercer Health & Benefits, Employer Experience
with, and Attitudes Toward, Coverage of Infertility Treatment (May 31, 2006) (copy on
file with author) (finding that of those surveyed, approximately 50 percent of employers
covered evaluation of infertility, 37 percent covered drug therapies, and 20 percent cov
ered "in vivo" or "in vitro" fertilization. Moreover, more than two-thirds have been
providing infertility coverage at their current level for more than five years).
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last few years, an increasing number of states have enacted man
dated benefits and consumer protection laws, and the scope of
these laws has expanded. "43
State efforts to reform the individual market to increase access
and afford ability have met with mixed results. 44 Many who turn to
the individual market for coverage still find themselves unable to
get, keep, or afford coverage. According to one survey, more than
half of those polled said that it was "difficult or impossible to find
a[n individual policy] to fit their health needs," and two-thirds said
that it was "difficult or impossible to find an affordable" individual
policy.45 As a result, less than one third of those who considered
individual coverage actually purchased a policy.46
II.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE HEALTH CARE CHOICE ACT

The Health Care Choice Act of 2005 claims to address barriers
to the individual market by increasing access and affordability.
Under current law, health insurance is regulated by each state, so
individuals must buy health insurance coverage in the state in which
they live. 47 If passed, the HCCA would allow health insurers to
offer individual policies of insurance from any state without being
required to comply with the laws of the insured's home state.
The insurer could file an individual heath insurance policy in a
state of its choosing,48 the "primary state," and then sell that cover
43. TRENDS AND INDICATORS, supra note 1, § 4 exhibit 4.12.
44. See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 7, at 9-14 (discussing findings based on a review
of the literature); TURNBULL & KANE, supra note 15, at vi-viii (summarizing findings
based on an assessment of reforms in seven states that adopted different approaches).
45. DUCHON ET AL., supra note 12, at 24; see also POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 12
(examining the application process of seven hypothetical consumers in the individual
insurance market).
46. DUCHON ET AL., supra hote 12, at 24 (reporting that "[o]nly 28 percent pur
chased a[n individual health] plan").
47. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, regulation of insurance is reserved to the
individual states. 15 U.S.c. § 1012(b) (2000) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed
to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the busi
ness of insurance.").
48. Health Care Choice Act of 2005, H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2795(1), 109th
Congo (2005). There are certain minimum requirements: the primary state must use a
risk-based capital formula for solvency, and have an independent external review law or
rules, unless the insurer's independent review process is the functional equivalent of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners' model act. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt.
D., § 2797.
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age in other states, the "secondary states."49 In general, the laws of
the primary state would apply to individual health insurance cover
age offered in the primary state or in any secondary state. 50 Insur
ers would be exempt from laws in the secondary states such as
guaranteed issue laws, guaranteed renewal laws, rating reforms,
and, significantly, mandated benefit laws. 51 However, insurers
would not be exempt from laws of the secondary states regarding
taxes, registration, financial examination, compliance with certain
court orders, participation in high-risk pools, and fraud, abuse, and
unfair claims practices. 52
Accordingly, individuals would be free to purchase policies
filed in states other than their own. Policies and renewal policies
sold in secondary states would be required to include a "clear and
conspicuous disclosure" that the policy is governed by the law of
the primary state. 53 Insurers would be permitted to change desig
nation of the primary state upon renewal, but would be required to
provide notice of such change to the insurance commissioners of
the primary and secondary state. 54
49. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(a)(1) (defining "primary state" and "sec
ondary state"). Any coverage offered in a secondary state must also be offered in the
insurer's primary state. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(e).
50. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(a).
51. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(b). The HCCA does prohibit the insurer
from reclassifying an insured based on health-status factors at renewal, or increasing
premiums based on health status or claims history. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D.,
§ 2796(d).
52. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2796(b).
53. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D, § 2796(c). Policies must provide the following
notice:
This policy is issued by __ and is governed by the laws and relations of the
State of __, and it has met all the laws of that State as determined by that
State's Department of Insurance. This policy may be less expensive than
others because it is not subject to all of the insurance laws and regulations of
the State of __, including coverage of some services or benefits mandated by
the law of the State of __. Additionally, this policy is not subject to all of the
consumer protection laws or restrictions on rate changes of the State of __.
As with all insurance products, before purchasing this policy, you should care
fully review the policy and determine what health care services the policy cov
ers and what benefits it provides, including any exclusions, limitations, or
conditions for such services or benefits.
Id.

54. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D, § 2796(g). Subsection (g) requires, inter alia:
Each health insurance issuer issuing individual health insurance coverage in
both primary and secondary States shall submit-(1) to the insurance commis
sioner of each State in which it intends to offer such coverage ... a copy of the
plan of operation or feasibility study ... wTitten notice of any change in its

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

484

[Vol. 29:473

Finally, the primary state would have sole jurisdiction to en
force its applicable laws. 55 The secondary state may enforce only
those laws from which the insurer is exempt, and may notify the
applicable authorities of the primary state of any suspected viola
tion of the primary state's laws. 56

III.

A

BAD CHOICE?

The HCCA has received little attention, perhaps because the
individual insurance market is small, and because the HCCA was
overshadowed by the Enzi Bill, which was aimed at the small-group
marketY But it is worth examining because it represents a bad
choice for the individual market. It does not appear that the
HCCA would lower costs for most purchasers, increase meaningful
choices, or reduce the overall number of uninsured. Instead, it may
further erode protections under state law, and undercut the role of
the states in regulating health insurance products and protecting
their citizens.
A.

Cost

Supporters of the HCCA58 claim that the cost of individual
health insurance would be lowered by offering consumers choices
across state lines. As explained by Senator Jim DeMint:
designation of its primary State; and ... written notice from the issuer of the
issuer's compliance with all the laws of the primary State.
Id.

55. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D, § 2798(a).
56. H.R. 2355, sec. 4(a), Pt. D., § 2798(d). Some opponents of the HCCA have
raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of enforcement under this section. See, e.g.,
FAMILIES USA, H.R. 2355: THE WRONG PRESCRIPTION FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE
NEEDS 2 (2006), available at http://www.familiesusa.orglassets/pdfslbad-ideas-shadegg
hr-2355.pdf. This is of concern in light of previous findings regarding fraud in the indi
vidual market. See, e.g., Health Insurance Challenges: Buyer Beware: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Congo 40 (2004) (statement of Robert 1. Cramer, Man
aging Dir., Off. of Special Investigations, U.S. Gen. Accounting Off.) ("At least 15,000
employers purchased coverage from unauthorized entities, affecting more than 200,000
policyholders from 2000 through 2002.").
57. Health Insurance Marketplace Modernization and Affordability Act of 2005
(Enzi), S. 1955, 109th Congo (2005).
58. Supporters of the HCCA include: Alliance for Affordable Services; Ameri
cans for Tax Reform; Chamber of Commerce of the United States; Council for Afforda
ble Health Insurance; eBay; Latino Coalition; The Maine Heritage Policy Center;
National Association for the Self-Employed; National Association of Insurance Com
missioners; National Center for Policy Analysis; National Federation of Independent
Business; National Taxpayers Union; Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council; and
Steve Forbes. See, e.g., Letter from Angela M. Hunter, Council for Affordable Health
Ins., Dir. of Fed. Affairs, to Rep. John Shadegg (May 12, 2005), available at http://www.
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Consumers can choose the policy that best suits their needs, and
their budget, without regard to State boundaries. Individuals
looking for basic health insurance coverage can opt for a policy
with few benefit mandates, and such a policy will be more afford
able. On the other hand, consumers who have an interest in a
particular benefit, such as infertility treatments, will be able to
purchase a policy which includes that benefit. 59

The argument is that state laws, and mandated benefit laws in
particular, make health insurance more expensive. 60 For example,
insurance industry advocacy groups such as the Council for Afford
able Health Insurance (CAHI)61 have stated that "in certain states,
cahi.orglcahi_contents/issues/HR2355supportltr.pdf; Letter from William Callaghan,
President, Alliance for Affordable Servs., to Rep. John Shadegg (May 5, 2005) (on file
with the author); Letter from Paul J. Gessing, Nat'l Tax Payers Union, Dir. of Gov't
Affairs, to Rep. John Shadegg (May 12, 2005), available at
http://www .cahi.orglcahi_con ten ts/issuesINTUltr05-11-05ShadeggHealth Care. pdf; Press
Release, Me. Heritage Pol'y Ctr., Free-Market Health Insurance Reform Introduced to
John Shadegg (May 12, 2005), available at http://www.cahi.orglcahi_contents/issues/
MaineHeritagePolicyPR05.12.pdf; Letter from Grover G. Norquist, President, Am. for
Tax Reform, to Sen. Jim DeMint (May 17, 2005) (on file with the author); Letter from
Dan Danner, Executive Vice President, Public Pol'y & Pol., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.,
to Rep. John Shadegg (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.cahi.orglcahi30ntents/
issuesINFIBsupportltr05.pdf; Letter from Tod H. Cohen, Vice President, Global Gov't
Relations, eBay, to Rep. John Shadegg (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.cahi.org/
cahi_contents/issues/latinocoalitionsupportltr05.pdf; Letter from Robert G. de Posada,
President, Latino Coalition, to Rep. John Shadegg (May 10, 2005), available at http://
www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/issues/latinocoalitionsupportltr05.pdf; Letter from Robert
Hughes, President, Nat'l Assoc'n for the Self-Employed, to Rep. John Shadegg (June
20, 2005), available at http://www.cahi.orglcahi_contents/issuesINASEsupportltr0705.
pdf.
59. 151 CONGo REC. S5073 (daily ed. May 12,2005) (statement of Sen. DeMint),
available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/040606jdtest.
pdf.
60. In the words of Senator DeMint, "The cost of insurance is often increased by
excessive State regulations. These State mandates raise the cost of insurance which, in
turn, increases the number of Americans who are priced out of the health insurance
market." Id. Conservative and industry advocacy groups also criticize guaranteed issue
and community rating laws. See, e.g., CONRAD F. MEIER, DESTROYING INSURANCE
MARKETS: How GUARANTEED ISSUE AND COMMUNITY RATING DESTROYED THE INDI·
VIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET IN EIGHT STATES (2005), available at http://www.cahi.orgl
cahi_contents/resources/pdfldestroyinginsmrkts05.pdf. The first finding in the text of
the HCCA appears to adopt this argument: "The application of numerous and signifi
cant variations in State law impacts the ability of insurers to offer, and individuals to
obtain, affordable health insurance coverage, thereby impeding commerce in individual
health insurance coverage." H.R. 2355, sec. 3(1).
61. According to its webpage, the Council for Affordable Health Insurance is "a
non-profit research and advocacy association whose mission is to develop and promote
free market solutions to America's health care challenges." Press Release, Council for
Affordable Health Ins., CAHI Applauds Florida's HSA for State Employees (Oct. 11,
2006), available at http://www.cahi.orglarticle.asp?id=697.
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mandated benefits have increased the cost of individual health in
surance by as much as 45%."62 Another study, by the Cato Insti
tute, claims that state mandated benefit laws have a net cost of
$13.5 billion. 63 Therefore, supporters of the HCCA argue, if con
sumers were able to purchase individual health insurance policies
from other states-presumably states with fewer mandated benefits
and protections-their coverage would cost less.
The claim that state mandated benefit laws dramatically in
crease the cost of individual coverage is "the traditional defense by
the insurance industry against coverage mandates of all sorts. "64
Although the impact of mandated coverage on health care premi
ums is an issue, the core assumption that state mandated benefit
laws dramatically increase the cost of individual insurance bears
close scrutiny. Indeed, according to the report of the Congressional
Budget Office generated in connection with the HCCA, "[even if]
only those benefit mandates imposed by the states with the lowest
cost mandates were in effect in all states, the price of individual
health insurance would be reduced by about 5 percent, on
average."65
Consider state mandates requiring cover~ge of infertility treat
ment, frequently singled out as an example of expensive and op
tional treatment,66 including in the HCCA's legislative history.67
Opponents of state laws mandating equitable coverage of infertility
treatment, such as the law in Massachusetts, would argue that in
62. COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., 2006 STATE LEGISLATORS' GUIDE
TO HEALTH INSURANCE SOLUTIONS 23-25 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 STATE LEGISLA
TORS' GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE SOLUTIONS], available at http://www.cahi.orgl
cahi_contents/resources/pdfl2006StateLeg.pdf (reporting that "as many as one in four
individuals who are without coverage are uninsured because of the cost of state health
benefits mandates").
63. Christopher 1. Conover, Health Care Regulation: A $169 Billion Hidden Tax,
CATO INST., Oct. 4, 2004, at 13, available at http://www.cato.orglpubs/pas/pa527.pdf.
64. Adam Sonfield, Drive for Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatment Raises
Questions of Equity, Cost, THE GUTTMACHER REP., Oct. 1999, at 4, 5, available at
http://www.guttmacher.orglpubs/tgr/02/5/gr020504.pdf.

65. CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 23, at 4.
66. Sonfield, supra note 64, at 5 (stating that" 'infertility treatment is sometimes
lumped together with cosmetic surgery as a life-style type procedure, rather than con
sidered serious medicine'" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Deborah
Wachenheim of RESOLVE)); see also Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility:
Recognizing Coverage Exclusions as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.l. 293,343 (2004)
[hereinafter Pendo, The Politics of Infertility].
67. 151 CONGo REC. S5073 (daily ed. May 12, 2005) (statement of Sen. DeMint),
available at http://www.senate.gov/-financelhearings/testimony/2005testl040606jdtest.
pdf.
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creased coverage of treatments for infertility, in particular in vitro
fertilization,68 would dramatically increase the cost of coverage.
However, this argument is unconvincing because there is evidence
that the cost of including comprehensive coverage of infertility
treatment is overstated. 69 Past studies have reported estimated cost
increases from $20 to $175 per year. 70 One recent study of more
than 900 employers found that 91 percent of employers who pro
vided infertility coverage for their employees did not experience an
increase in their medical costs as a result of providing coverage for
infertility treatment, including employers offering coverage of in vi
tro fertilization.?l Of course, cost data from the group market is not
readily transferable to the individual market due to decreased risk
pooling, but it does suggest that cost arguments against state man
dates should be scrutinized.
While evidence that the HCCA would significantly reduce the
cost of individual policies overall is far from convincing, it does ap
pear likely that allowing people to purchase less comprehensive
policies across state lines would reduce the cost of such policies for
some. As noted by the Congressional Budget Office, the HCCA
would "reduce the price of individual health insurance coverage for
people expected to have relatively low health care costs, while in
creasing the price of coverage for those expected to have relatively
high health care costS."72 This creates the risk of adverse selection,
a process by which people who have higher health care costs seek
health insurance at a disproportionate rate to people who have (or
68. "In vitro" fertilization is a process in which the ova are removed from the
woman's body by laproscopy, fertilized with semen from her partner or a donor, incu
bated in a laboratory dish until an embryo develops, and then transferred to the wo
man's uterus. RESOLVE, RESOLVING INFERTILITY: UNDERSTANDING THE OPTIONS
AND CHOOSING SOLUTIONS WHEN You WANT TO HAVE A BABY 176-77, 179-83 (Diane
Aronson, ed., 1999).
69. See Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 340-42 (discussing costs
of comprehensive treatment of infertility).
70. Jane Gross, The Fight to Cover Infertility: Suit Says Employer's Refusal to Pay
is Form of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at B1, available at 1998 WLNR 2965792
(Westlaw) ("A study in Massachusetts, based on actual experience, found that the addi
tional cost of such coverage was $1.71 a month per member. Other studies, based on
projections, put the cost at about $3 a year."); Shorge Sato, Note, A Little Bit Disabled:
Infertility and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 189,
197-200 (2001) (stating that the National Center for Policy Analysis "alleged a much
higher premium increase ... raising the cost of a policy from $105 to $175 per year").
71. There is also evidence that comprehensive coverage of infertility treatment
could achieve cost savings, at least in the group market. Sato, supra note 70, at 198-99;
see also Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 342-43.
72. CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 23, at 13.
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think they have) relatively lower health care costS?3 Similarly,
under the HCCA, individuals with relatively low health care costs
could choose cheaper out-of-state policies, thus increasing the pro
portion of people with higher health care costs and ultimately erod
ing the availability of more comprehensive coverage in the home
state. This causes the pool of people to lose its healthier members
and costs to increase, a process called the "death spiral."74 Indeed,
studies of state reforms suggest that if insurers organized in weaker
regulation states, as permitted under the HCCA, older and less
healthy consumers could have difficulty getting coverage?5
B.

Access

Opponents of the HCCA76 also note that without decreasing
costs and increasing choice, it appears unlikely that the HCCA
73. Professor Mary Crossley made a similar argument with respect to health sav
ings accounts. Mary Crossely, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insur
ance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 136-37 (2005).
74. See CLAUDIA H. WILLIAMS & BETH C. FUCHS, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON
FOUND., POLICY BRIEF No.4, at 2 (2004), available at http://www.rwjf.orglpublications/
synthesis/reports_and_briefs/pdf/no4_policybrief.pdf (discussing "adverse selection");
NANCY C. TURNBULL ET AL., INSURING THE HEALTHY OR INSURING THE SICK? THE
DILEMMA OF REGULATING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET: SHORT
CASE STUDIES OF SIX STATES 20 (2005), available at http://www.cmwf.orglusr_doc/790_
turnbuIUnsurin~healthy_ocsick_case_studies.pdf (discussing "adverse selection
spiral").
75. See TURNBULL & KANE, supra note 15, at vii ("In the four states with weaker
regulations a significant percentage of applicants-as many as 30 percent to 40 percent
for some carriers-is rejected for coverage, leaving these people with no option except
high-risk pools with very expensive premiums.").
76. Opponents of the HCCA include: AFL-CIO; Alliance for Advancing Non
profit Health Care; Alliance for Children & Families; American Academy of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry; American Academy of HIV Medicine; American Academy of
Physician Assistants; American Association for Geriatric Psychiatry; American Associ
ation for Marriage and Family Therapy; American Association of People with Disabili
ties; American Chiropractic Association; American College of Nurse-Midwives;
American Counseling Association; American Federation of State, County and Munici
pal Employees; American Group Psychotherapy Association; American Nurses Associ
ation; American Occupational Therapy Association; American Podiatric Medical
Association; American Psychological Association; American Psychotherapy Associa
tion; American Society of Pediatric Nephrology; Anxiety Disorders Association of
America; Association for the Advancement of Psychology; Association of University
Centers on Disabilities; Clinical Social Work Guild 49, OPEIU; Commission on Social
Action of Reform Judaism; Committee of Ten Thousand; Communications Workers of
America; Consumers Union; Delta Dental Plans Association; Depression and Bipolar
Support Alliance; Eating Disorders Coalition for Research, Policy and Action; Family
USA; Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights; HIP Health Plan of New York;
Hemophilia Federation of America; International Brotherhood of Electric Workers;
NAADAC, Association for Addiction Professionals; NETWORK, a National Catholic
Social Justice Lobby; National Association of Anorexia Nervosa and Associated Disor
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would significantly reduce the number of uninsured. Indeed, the
Congressional Budget Office predicted that the HCCA would not
lead to a significant net increase in the number of people with insur
ance,77 although there could be a shift of approximately one million
people from employer-sponsored coverage to the individual mar
ket. 78 In light of the problems with individual coverage outlined
above, simply shifting one million people from employer-sponsored
coverage to the individual market not only fails to solve the prob
lem, but also appears to make it worseJ9
C.

Adequacy

Those who are able to access and afford individual coverage
may find themselves underinsured, particularly if they choose a less
comprehensive policy.80 In addition, the HCCA would do little to
ders; National Association of Social Workers; National Council for Community Behav
ioral Healthcare; National Council of Jewish Women; National Disability Rights
Network; National Health Law Program; National Hemophilia Foundation; National
Mental Health Association; National Multiple Sclerosis Society; National Partnership
for Women and Families; National Women's Law Center; Public Citizen; Service Em
ployees International Union; Suicide Prevention Action Network USA; The Arc of the
United States; U.S. PIRG; United Cerebral Palsy. See Letter from Nat'l Partnership
for Women & Families, to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, U.S. H. of Reps.
(June 20, 2006), available at http://www.aapd-dc.orgipolicies/so060622hr2355.htm.
77. CBO COST ESTIMATE, supra note 23, at 7 ("CBO estimates that enacting
H.R. 2355 would not have a substantial effect on the number of people who have health
insurance coverage: compared to current law, there could be a small increase or de
crease in the number of uninsured individuals.").
78. Id. at 5 ("CBO estimates that H.R. 2355 ultimately would reduce annual
spending on employer-sponsored health insurance by $5 billion in 2006 dollars."); see
also id. at 1 ("The increase in revenues would result largely from a reduction in the
number of people who receive health insurance through employer-sponsored plans.
That would reduce the share of compensation that is tax-advantaged ... and increase
the share that is taxable ....").
79. Nor is there strong evidence that bypassing state law mandates and consumer
protections would increase consumer choice, as several studies have shown that a few
insurers dominate the individual insurance market. TURNBULL & KANE, supra note 15,
at viii (emphasis omitted) ("A few carriers in each state dominate the individual health
insurance market, a trend that has strengthened over time."); THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., TRENDS AND INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MAR.
KETPLACE-SECTION 5: TRENDS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH CARE MARKET.
PLACE exhibit 5.12, available at http://www.kff.orglinsuranceI7031 (follow the "Section
5" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 22, 2007); FUCHS, supra note 7, at 3 (citation omitted)
("While hundreds of insurance companies and health plans still sell in the individual
market, only a few insurers account for 50 percent or more of the market in any
state.").
80. "Underinsured" is generally understood as "[h]aving coverage that is inade
quate, either because it includes high copayments and deductibles or because important
costs are not covered." NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FORUM FOR
STATE HEALTH POLICY LEADERSHIP, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, ACCESS AND
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reduce cost sharing such as deductibles and co-insurance, or admin
istrative costs, all of which are higher with individual plans. 81
D.

Eroding State Mandates

As described above, the HCCA would permit health insurers
to sell policies from the states with the fewest consumer protec
tions, and to market and sell those policies to consumers in all other
states. As noted above, several states have begun to require equita
ble coverage of infertility treatment. Under the HCCA, an insurer
from outside these states would be permitted to sell a policy of in
surance to citizens of these states without these protections. In this
respect, the HCCA may do to the individual insurance market what
preemption under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 197482 (ERISA) has done to self-funded group plans.
It is well-known that state law mandates requiring coverage of
certain conditions or treatments are unlikely to lead to uniform re
sults because of the structure of the preemption provisions of ER
ISA.83 ERISA, which regulates employer-sponsored welfare
benefit plans including health benefit plans,84 "contains a broad
preemption clause that preempts state law insofar as it 'relates to'
employee benefit plans, and ERISA provides the exclusive reme
dial scheme for ERISA benefits claims."85 ERISA preemption has
three parts. First, the "preemption clause" provides that ERISA
supersedes any and all state laws that relate to any employee beneTHE UNINSURED 13, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/faqaccess.
pdf.
81. See ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra note 30, at 5; Gabel et aI., Indi
vidual Insurance, supra note 8, at W173 (citation omitted) ("Fees paid to insurance
agents often constitute 10·15 percent of the premium dollar. Whereas administrative
expenses consume about 25-40 percent of each premium dollar for individual insurance,
they account for about 10 percent of each premium dollar among large employer
groups and 15-25 percent in the small-group market."); Mark V. Pauly & Allison M.
Percy, Cost and Performance: A Comparison of the Individual and Group Health Insur
ance Markets, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 9, 18 (2000) (stating that administrative
loading on individual policies is one-third to one-half of premiums, in excess of the 5 to
30 percent for group policies).
82. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.s.c. §§ 1001-1461 (2000».
83. See, e.g., Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 302; Colleen E.
Medill, HIPAA and its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of
Private Health Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 491-92 (1998); John V. Jacobi, The
Ends of Health Insurance, 30 u.c. DAVIS L. REV. 311,352-61 (1997).
84. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.s.c. § 1002.
85. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 309.
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fit plan. 86 Second, the "savings clause" exempts specific state laws
regulating insurance, banking, and securities law from preemp
tion.87 Third, under the "deemer clause," self-funded 88 employee
welfare plans cannot be deemed insurance plans, and therefore will
not be subject to specific state regulation. 89
Because self-funded plans cannot be deemed insurance plans,
state laws directed at insurance are not saved with respect to self
funded plans, and self-funded plans have not been considered sub
ject to specific state regulation. 90 In the context of state laws man
dating coverage of a certain treatment or condition, it is well
accepted that the structure of ERISA preemption leads to dramati
cally different results because such laws apply to insured plans, but
not to self-funded plans. 91 For example, state laws mandating cov
erage, such as the Massachusetts law mandating equitable coverage
of infertility treatment, apply to most non-ERISA plans, such as
individual policies, and to ERISA plans that are insured, but not to
self-funded plans. The HCCA could do to the individual market
what ERISA has done in the employer-based system-introduce an
increasingly inequitable pattern of protection for people with indi
vidual coverage, even within the same state.
IV.

THE POLITICS OF "CHOICE"

The HCCA is an example of the current political approach to
our health care crisis. Although it is aimed at one small part of the
overall health insurance market and although it may not pass,92 it is
86. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.c. § 1144(a).
87. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.c. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
88. "A self-funded plan is one in which the plan sponsor, rather than a health
insurer, assumes the risk of covering the costs of the health care benefits provided by
the terms of the plan." Colleen E. Medill et aI., Coverage of Reproductive Technologies
under Employer-Sponsored Health Care Plans, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 523, 541
(2004).
89. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.c. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
90. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.s.c. § 1144(b)(2)(B); FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (interpreting the deemer clause broadly to exempt self-funded,
ERISA-regulated plans from state regulation and state law claims).
91. See Pendo, The Politics of Infertility, supra note 66, at 312 n.101 (discussing
deemer clause exemptions of self-funded plans from other state laws, and the regulation
of self-insured plans generally).
92. As reported by Hewitt Associates, "It is unclear if Congress will address [the
HCCA] this year. House leaders are reluctant to bring H.R. 2355 to the floor since it
may not have enough votes for approval." HEWITT Assocs., HEWITT FEDERAL LEGIS·
LATION QUICK GUIDE, PENDING LEGISLATION-HEALTH AND WELFARE PLANS 12
(2006), available at http://www.hewittassociates.com/_MetaBasicCMAssetCachej
Assets/Legislative%20Updates/Quick%20Guide/hc_080806.pdf.
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representative of the larger political approach to health care policy,
focused on individual, market-based solutions to the health care cri
sis. With respect to the individual market, the current administra
tion is proposing tax-credits for the purchase of individual
policies,93 and supporters of the HCCA are also urging similar re
forms to the individual market, including an optional federal char
ter, allowing insurers to file plans with the federal government and
then sell insurance in any state, and an interstate compact permit
ting multi-state association. 94 In the insurance market generally,
the administration is promoting the use of health savings accounts
in connection with a high-deductible policy, a combination referred
to as a consumer-driven health plan. 95
As Deborah Stone stated in her influential article, The Struggle
for the Soul of Health Insurance, "The politics of American health
insurance is a struggle over which vision of distributive justice
should govern: the solidarity principle or the logic of actuarial fair
ness."96 In Stone's view, the solidarity principle recognizes that in
surance is a form of mutual aid and collective responsibility, and
that redistribution from the healthy to the sick is a necessary part of
health insurance. 97 Indeed, Stone describes broad-based, inclusive
systems of insurance as a social good:
To participate in a risk-pooling scheme is to agree to tax yourself
not only for your own benefit should you incur a loss, but also for
the benefit of others who might suffer from loss when you do not.

93. See Making Health Care More Affordable and Accessible for All Americans,
supra note 9.
94. 2006 STATE LEGISLATORS' GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE SOLUTIONS, supra
note 62, at 35.
95. See Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 291
93 (discussing the shift toward consumer-directed health plans). The Medicare Pre
scription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 amended the Internal
Revenue Code to authorize the use of tax-favored health savings accounts in connec
tion with a high-deductible health insurance policy. Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1201, 117
Stat. 2066, 2469 (2003). The combination is referred to as the consumer-driven health
plan. See Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 291-93.
96. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 287, 287 (1993) [hereinafter Stone, The Struggle for the Soul
of Health Insurance] ("Redistribution from the healthy to the sick is built into insur
ance. Payouts are made on the basis of need (or loss incurred) not on the basis of
contribution to the scheme .... [S]ubsidy from the vast majority of policyholders to a
small minority is precisely what is supposed to happen in insurance.").
97. Id. at 292.
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Insurance thus creates what might be called a "moral opportu
nity," the opportunity to cooperate with and help others. 98

Despite the powerful influence of a conservative free-market ideol
ogy, "health insurance in the United States began as a social enter
prise, and the concept of health insurance as a collective concern
continues to resonate with the public."99
In the context of the individual insurance market, state reforms
which have attempted to make coverage more accessible and af
fordable (particularly to those who need it most), and to pool risk
across a larger number of people, have exemplified the social soli
darity point. lOO For example, according to a survey of the literature,
comprehensive state reforms to the individual market made cover
age more expensive on average, although it did increase af
fordability and access to coverage for those who needed it most. lOl
In contrast, the principle of actuarial fairness, which Stone de
fines as "each person paying for his own risk," rejects redistribution
from the healthy to the sick.102 Instead, it seeks to divide and cate
gorize people into small, discrete groups based on individually as
sessed risks.103 As such, it is highly individualistic, and aligned with
the interests of private insurers in a competitive market: "Public
policy has, for over a century, both permitted and exhorted insurers
to compete in the market, on the theory that competition would
breed innovation, efficiency, and ultimately public welfare."104
The HCCA and similar proposals follow the logic of actuarial
fairness by touting individual choice and freedom as the solution to
a variety of problems with the individual market. IOS People in need
of insurance are seen as autonomous, individual consumers, free to
make choices in the market. I06 As Stone explains,
98. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 14 (1999).
99. Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 293 (cit
ing Victor R. Fuchs, What"s Ahead for Health Insurance in the United States?, 346 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1822, 1822 (2002».
100. Thomas R. Oliver, Dynamics Without Change: The New Generation, 25 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 225, 226 (2000) (referring to the work of Len M. Nichols).
101. FUCHS, supra note 7, at 12.
102. See Crossley, supra note 73, at 77.
103. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, supra note 96, at 290.
104. Id. at 313.
105. I have written previously about this conception of "choice" in the context of
consumer-driven health plans. See Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film,
supra note 6, at 291-93.
106. Alan Peterson, Risk, Governance and the New Public Health, in FOUCAULT,
HEALTH AND MEDICINE 189, 194 (Alan R. Petersen & Robin Bunton, eds., 1997) (cita
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In the competitive market, customers would shop around for the
best deals to suit their budgets and their risk preferences. Those
who know (or think) they have a low risk for particular diseases
would buy just the policies tailored to their own risk profiles.
Through self-selection and pursuit of the almighty bargain, indi
viduals would sort themselves into homogenous risk classes, al
beit perhaps not as refined as the classes achieved though
underwriting. The market could accomplish for insurers what
government forbids them to do themselves. 107

This is echoed in the words of Senator DeMint:
The Health Care Choice Act will allow consumers to shop for
health insurance the same way they do for other insurance prod
ucts-online, by mail, over the phone, or in consultation with an
insurance agent in their hometown. The Act empowers consum
ers by giving them the ability to purchase an affordable health
insurance policy with a range of options. lOS

"'[C)hoice' also includes individual responsibility to make the
right choices in terms of price and quality and the individual obliga
tion to bear the consequences of such choices. "109 As scholars of
neo-liberalism in health care policy have noted, current health care
policy is "increasingly requiring that individuals take personal re
sponsibility for their own future and purchase goods and services
which are designed to meet their personal requirements."l1o More
over, failure to make the right choices is seen as a personal failure,
rather than a failure of the system to provide adequate options. 111
tion omitted) ("[N]eo-liberal rationality emphasises [sic] the entrepreneurial individual,
endowed with freedom and autonomy, and the capacity to properly care for him- or
herself.").
107. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, supra note 96, at 314.
108. 151 CONGo REC. S5073 (daily ed. May 12, 2005) (statement of Sen. DeMint),
available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2005te st/040606jdtest.
pdf.
109. Pendo, Images of Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 293.
110. Sarah Nettleton, Governing the Risky Self" How to Become Healthy, Wealthy
and Wise, in FOUCAULT, HEALTH AND MEDICINE, supra note 106, at 208.
111. This is a strain of neo-liberal theory that some scholars have applied to
health care policy. See, e.g., Monica Greco, Psychosomatic Subjects and the 'Duty to be
Well': Personal Agency Within Medical Rationality, 22 ECON. & SOC'y 357,361 (1993)
("If the regulation of life-style, the modification of risky behaviour and the transforma
tion of unhealthy attitudes prove impossible though sheer strength of will, this consti
tutes, at least in part, a failure of the self to take care of itself-a form of irrationality, or
simply a lack of skillfulness . ..."); Peterson, supra note 106, at 194 ("[S]ince the mid
1970s, there has been a clear ideological shift away from the notion that the state should
protect the health of individuals to the idea that individuals should take responsibility
to protect themselves from risk.").
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Not surprisingly, scholars looking at reforms to the individual mar
ket have raised "fundamental questions about the role of competi
tive markets in promoting access to health care."112 As one author
has noted, "Are all the choices in benefits, cost-sharing, premiums,
and market entry and exit really that valuable, though, for most
customers? To argue that one can get a good price if one is 'aggres
sive, informed, interested, and lucky' is not comforting."113
CONCLUSION

The increasingly high cost of health care and the growing num
ber of Americans without insurance are again making health care
reform a prominent national issue. Lack of insurance hurts the
health and finances of people without insurance 114 and people with
insurance, who bear the burden of increased premiums.1 15 It also
damages the national economy, costing $65 to $130 billion accord
ing to one estimate. 1l6 Public support for health care reform is also
high.1 17 A recent survey showed that most people felt that our
health care system needs either "fundamental change" or "com
112. Robert B. Hackey, The Politics of Reform, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L.
211, 211 (2000).
113. Oliver, supra note 100, at 227-28.
114. For an overview of the uninsured and access to care, see Pendo, Images of
Health Insurance in Popular Film, supra note 6, at 280-82.
115. See, e.g., FAMILIES USA, PAYING A PREMIUM: THE ADDED COST OF CARE
FOR THE UNINSURED 1 (2005), available at http://www.familiesusa.orglassets/pdfs/
Paying...a_Premium_rev_July_13731e.pdf ("In 2005, premium costs for family health in
surance coverage provided by private employers will include an extra $922 in premiums
due to the cost of care for the uninsured; premiums for individual coverage will cost an
extra $341. ").
116. Paul Fronstin & Ray Werntz, The "Business Case" for Investing in Employee
Health: A Review of the Literature and Employer Self-Assessments, EMP. BENEFIT RES.
INST., Mar. 2004, at 7, 8, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0304ib.pdf.
117. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE PUBLIC, MANAGED CARE,
AND CONSUMER PROTECTIONS, KAISER PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE 2 (2001), available at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/PublicOpinionUpdatel.pdf
(stating that "at least three out of four Americans support[] such laws over time");
Attitudes Toward the United States' Health Care System: Long-Term Trends, HEALTH
CARE NEWS, Aug. 21, 2002, at 1, 1-5 available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/
newsletters/healthnews/HCHealthCareNews2002VoI2_lss17.pdf (discussing a 2002 poll,
which showed that the prior-documented gaps between the views of the public, physi
cians, employers, hospital managers, and health plan managers have narrowed, with the
level of support for "radical change" similar across these groups); see also Humphrey
Taylor, Attitudes to Government Regulation Vary Greatly for Different Industries, Harris
Poll No. 19 (Apr. 2, 2003), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=
367 (discussing a 2003 poll, in which two of the top four industries most often character
ized as needing more regulation were the managed care industry and the health insur
ance industry, ranking just in front of the pharmaceutical and oil industries).
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plete rebuilding," and that expanding coverage and controlling
costs should be top priorities for federal action. 118 Despite the
claims of its proponents, the HCCA is unlikely to solve the
problems of afford ability and access that it claims to address, and it
may in fact exacerbate them.
On a political level, the continued focus on individual "choice"
and market-based solutions as a response to our deepening health
care crisis is counterproductive. Individualistic, market-based solu
tions like the HCCA will not address systemic issues such as the
increasingly high cost of health care or the growing crisis of un- and
under-insurance. Instead, these proposed solutions may dispropor
tionately disadvantage those in less-than-perfect health by further
fragmenting the market.

118.

CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, PUBLIC VIEWS ON

3, 11 (2006), available at http://
www.cmwf.org/usr_doC/Schoen_publicviewsfuturehltsystem_948.pdf.
SHAPING THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM

